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ABSTRACT 
As the bioenergy industry in the U.S. expands to meet increased 
demands for transportation fuel under the Renewable Fuel Standard 
and electrical power under state Renewable Portfolio Standards and 
the proposed Clean Power Plan, producers of biomass will seek the 
ability to grow dedicated, high-yielding energy crops of a perennial 
nature on leased property.  Given the large amount of leased farmland 
in the U.S., the contributions of tenant-farmers will represent a 
significant, though currently not well understood, segment of the 
biomass supply chain.  Through the use of contracts as governance 
schemes, landowners and tenants can navigate three key challenges of 
the bioeconomy: the necessity of long-term access to land coupled with 
the development of equitable termination clauses; assuaging landowner 
concerns regarding the potential invasiveness associated with some 
novel bioenergy crops; and the reclamation of rhizomes as an 
additional revenue stream associated with perennial biomass 
production. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A variety of state and federal renewable energy mandates and 
incentives,1 along with numerous sustainability and low-carbon 
standards,2 are driving interest in perennial energy crop production.  
Significant amounts of biomass will be necessary to achieve these 
standards.  For instance, research indicates that by 2030 the United 
States will consume 329 million dry tons of forest and agricultural 
feedstocks for energy production, primarily for co-firing electricity 
generation facilities.3  Producers’ ability to supply biomass through 
bioenergy crops is critical to the commercialization process and to 
ensuring the viability of the biofuel industry.4 
Two such agricultural crops are Miscanthus5 and switchgrass,6 
 
 1. E.g., Clean Power Plan, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,829 (June 2, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 60); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (originally codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)); Renewables Portfolio Standards for Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF 
STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY (2010), http://www.dsireusa.org/. 
 2. E.g., Jody M. Endres, Legitimacy, Innovation, and Harmonization: Precursors to 
Operationalizing Biofuels Sustainability Standards, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1 (2012); Jody M. Endres, 
Agriculture at a Crossroads: Energy Biomass Standards and a New Sustainability Paradigm?, 
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 503 (2011). 
 3. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. BILLION-TON UPDATE: BIOMASS SUPPLY FOR A 
BIOENERGY AND BIOPRODUCTS INDUSTRY 15 (2011). 
 4. Ira Altman et al., Producer Willingness to Supply Biomass: the Effects of Price and 
Producer Characteristics 2 (Feb. 2011) (Southern Agricultural Economics Association, Annual 
Meetings 2007) available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/98804/2/SAEA_2011_ 
Producer_Willingness_ to_Supply_Biomass.pdf. 
 5. Miscanthus × giganteus is a second-generation bioenergy crop grown primarily for heat 
and electricity generation which can also be used to produce transportation fuels. It is already 
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perennial energy grasses included under the Biomass Crop Assistance 
Program (BCAP) and considered by scientists and policy makers to 
have significant environmental and economic benefits.7  
Economically, perennial energy crops require fewer mechanical and 
chemical inputs than traditional grain or oil seed production, creating 
a potentially lucrative industry for those who grow them.8 
These crops also tout both large-scale and small-scale 
environmental benefits.  Requiring few inputs and creating few 
emissions, these crops present the opportunity to create energy more 
sustainably.  Additionally, extensive root systems allow the grasses to 
grow on highly erodible land.9  These qualities reduce soil erosion and 
improve water quality.10  Along with a high yield potential, these 
features have propelled Miscanthus and switchgrass to the center of 
bioenergy discourse.11  The success of the bioenergy industry will 
therefore improve sustainability, both through soil health and a lower 
ecological footprint resulting from the production of energy. 
While the technologies for processing perennial feedstocks into 
renewable energy are nearing financial viability, the transaction 
costs12 associated with biomass production and exchange remain a 
decisive barrier to commercial development.13  Agricultural 
production typically takes place on rented land; in 2012, 86% of grain 
 
grown commercially in the UK and several other countries for biomass production.  The plant is 
a naturally occurring, sterile, hybrid between Miscanthus sinensis and M. sacchariflous.  Dudley 
G. Christian, Nicola E. Yates & Andrew B. Riche, Estimation of Ramet Production from 
Miscanthus × giganteus Rhizome of Different Ages, 30 INDUS. CROPS & PRODUCTS 176, 176 
(2009). 
 6. Switchgrass is a warm-season perennial grass native to most of North America and 
commonly grown for forage and grazing.  Kimberly Jensen et al., Farmer Willingness to Grow 
Switchgrass for Energy Production, 31 BIOMASS & BIOENERGY 773, 773 (2007); James P. Muir 
et al., Biomass Production of ‘Alamo’ Switchgrass in Response to Nitrogen, Phosphorus, and 
Row Spacing, 93 AGRONOMY J. 896, 896 (2001).  
 7. Miriam A. Cope, Sara McLafferty & Bruce L. Rhoads, Farmer Attitudes Toward 
Production of Perennial Energy Grasses in East Central Illinois: Implications for Community-
Based Decision Making, 101 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 852, 853 (2011).  
 8. Jensen et al., supra note 6, at 773.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Cope et al., supra note 7, at 853–54.  
 12. These transaction costs include a lack of coordination between contracting parties, 
holdup costs, and economic barriers to market opportunities.  Jody M. Endres, A. Bryan Endres 
& Jeremy J. Stoller, Building Bio-Based Supply Chains: Theoretical Perspectives on Innovative 
Contract Design, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 72, 98 (2013).  
 13. Ira J. Altman, Dwight R. Sanders & Chris R. Boessen, Applying Transaction Cost 
Economics: A Note on Biomass Supply Chains, 25 J. AGRIBUSINESS 107, 107 [hereinafter 
Altman et al., Applying TCE] (2007). 
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production in central Illinois took place on rented land,14 outside of 
the Midwest, about 40% of agricultural land is rented.15  High rental 
rates and the vagaries of oral contracts lead to leases which do not 
properly incentivize farmers and landowners to participate in growing 
bioenergy crops.  Nonetheless, the contractual decisions underlying 
the industry’s current state remain underrepresented in the 
literature.16 
Biomass production can only succeed to the extent that tenant-
farmers and landowners are willing to engage in this new industry.17  
The perennial nature of many leading bioenergy crop candidates will 
present unique contracting challenges because the existing farmland 
rental market is based on an annual lease term.  Furthermore, 
economic circumstances of the bioenergy sector will likely be highly 
variable and dependent on factors such as the price of fossil fuels, 
agronomic factors, and technological considerations.18  This emerging 
economic environment creates potential for incomplete contracts and 
opportunism throughout the supply chain, particularly with regards to 
land rental markets.19  These additional risks further compound the 
risk inherent to all farm operations.20 
 
 14. Gary Schnitkey, Farmland Ownership and Rental Percentages in Illinois: A 2007 to 2012 
Perspective, FARMDOC DAILY (July 2013), available at http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2013/07/ 
farmland-ownership-rental-illinois-2007-2012.html. 
 15. Edward Cox, A Lease-Based Approach to Sustainable Farming, Part I: Farm Tenancy 
Trends and the Outlook for Sustainability on Rented Land, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 369, 372 
(2010)  (citing NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERVICE, USDA, PERCENT OF LAND IN FARMS RENTED 
OR LEASED: 2007 (2007)). 
 16. Ira J. Altman, Chris R. Boessen & Dwight R. Sanders, Contracting for Biomass: Supply 
Chain Strategies for Renewable Energy (Southern Agricultural Economics Association, Annual 
Meetings 2007), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/34907/1/sp07al01.pdf.  
 17. For the purposes of this paper, we explore cash rental agreements, as opposed to share 
rental agreements.  This decision reflects the modern trend regarding farmland ownership and 
rental percentages.  
 18. Altman et al., Applying TCE, supra note 13, at 109.  
 19. Id. 
 20. See Endres et al., supra note 12, at 88 (“Risk is inherent in all farming operations, and 
successful producers expend considerable effort to manage negative risk exposure. . . . The main 
categories of producer risk traditionally include yield/production, price, institutional, 
human/personal, and financial. Weather and technology are the primary components of yield 
risk. Price risk refers to uncertainty in input and output prices, and institutional risk arises from 
changes in agricultural policies (e.g., price supports, ethanol mandates) and regulations (e.g., 
watershed protection, odor or dust minimization). Personal risks include the risk of producer 
injury or death. Farmers also face asset risk, the chance of loss of equipment, and contracting 
risk, which includes the threat of opportunistic behavior of contracting parties. Financial risk 
includes the business risks of obtaining and financing capital.”) (citing JOY HARWOOD ET AL., 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MANAGING RISK IN FARMING: CONCEPTS, RESEARCH, AND ANALYSIS 
7 (1999)).  
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This article will focus on three key differences between perennial 
energy crop production and traditional farming.  First, perennial 
energy crops require a larger up front cost than traditional crops.  
Second, perennial energy crops present a greater risk of invasiveness.  
Third, perennial energy crops produce rhizomes, which might be 
either a nuisance or an asset to tenant-farmers and landowners.  We 
suggest that tenant-farmers and landowners engage in more complex 
lease agreements, with specific clauses to account for these 
differences.21  Improving these three areas will improve the initial 
segment of the bioenergy supply chain, and encourage both tenant-
farmers and landowners to participate in this new industry. 
II. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INSIGHT 
INTO THE LEASING PROBLEMS POSED BY PERENNIAL ENERGY 
CROPS 
Contracts theory provides two paradigms for approaching 
agreements such as the leases which tenant-farmers engage in with 
landowners.  Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) dictates that, in 
some cases, contracts should be more complex, with clauses to 
appropriately incentivize the parties and distribute risk.  Classical 
Contract Theory (CCT) suggests the opposite.  Under CCT, simple, 
short-term contracts are preferable to complex, long-term contracts.  
With regard to bioenergy crop production, the insights of TCE are 
essential to ensuring that this nascent industry succeeds. 
A. Transaction Cost Economics 
TCE theory provides a lens for navigating such contractual 
uncertainty.22  TCE focuses on coordination problems among 
 
 21. This article assumes that the negotiating parties will commit their agreement to writing.  
There are a number of reasons why agricultural leases should be in writing; reducing the 
agreement between the land owner and the land operator to a written document brings 
discipline to the negotiation process, helps the parties focus on key leasing issues to be resolved, 
helps the parties realize when they are in agreement and when they are not, and preserves the 
agreement for future reference when memories may have faded. Donald L. Uchtmann, Should 
A Farm Lease be Written and Is an Illinois Farm Tenant Protected If the Lease Is Oral?, AGRIC. 
L. & TAX’N BRIEFS (2007), available at http:// farmdoc.illinois.edu/legal/articles/ALTBs/ALTB_ 
07-01/ALTB_07-01.pdf.  While this advice is appropriate for traditional row cropping, it is 
particularly sage for bioenergy farm leases to be reduced to writing.  As we discuss at length in 
this article, the parties to the agreement should agree to a governance scheme specific to the 
particular bioenergy crop, which would be difficult, if not impossible, to commit to memory. 
 22. Effective bioenergy farm leases will be grounded in economic theory—specifically, 
given their uncertainty, in transaction cost economics.  Given the specialized nature of the 
bioenergy farm lease, it is difficult to evaluate the economic virtues of a model contract by using 
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economic agents.23  Within an organization or supply chain, 
individuals’ goals come into conflict, causing parties to abandon their 
responsibilities, renege on understandings, and engage in other non-
cooperative behavior.24  TCE examines individuals’ ability to devise 
mechanisms—referred to as “governance structures”—that alleviate 
potential conflicts by adjusting incentives, risks, and authority.25 
Governance structures fit within a spectrum between “market” 
and “hierarchy.”26  At one end lies the spot market, used mostly in 
simple transactions such as basic commodity sales.27  Here, market 
prices provide incentives for the exploitation of profit opportunities, 
and market participants are quick to adapt to changing scenarios as 
prices reveal information over time.28  On the other end of the 
spectrum lies the fully integrated firm, where trading parties are 
under unified ownership and control.29  TCE suggests that this end of 
the governance structure spectrum offers greater protection for 
specific investments and provides relatively efficient mechanisms for 
 
empirical studies that are based on cross-sectional comparisons of different contracts.  
Accordingly, the design of an effective bioenergy farm lease will not rely on surveys or case 
studies alone, but, rather, will be grounded in economic theory.  Corinne Alexander et al., 
Contract Theory and Implications for Perennial Energy Crop Contracting, 34 ENERGY ECON. 
970, 970 (2012). 
 23. Peter G. Klein & Howard A. Shelanski, Transaction Cost Economics in Practice: 
Applications and Evidence, 4 J. MARKET FOCUSED MGMT. 281, 282 (1996).  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  TCE further places particular emphasis on asset specificity, which is defined as the 
value of assets in alternative uses.  Asset specificity can refer to physical asset specificity (when 
assets are tailored to meet the needs of a particular trading partner), spatial asset specificity 
(when location creates dependency), dedicated assets (when expansion investments are made to 
meet the needs of a particular trading partner), human asset specificity (or, learning by doing), 
and temporal asset specificity (where timing of the assets is specific and critical).  Asset 
specificity is prevalent in the biofuel industry—equipment must be tailored to plant, harvest, 
store, and transport these novel crops (physical asset specificity); the relationship between the 
location of processing plants and the supplied biomass is vitally important to the strength of the 
industry (spatial asset specificity); farmers must learn how to grow perennial energy crops 
(human asset specificity); and the timing of biomass harvesting and storage is critical to the 
health of the biomass supply chain (temporal asset specificity).  Furthermore, in TCE, the 
importance of asset specificity is attributed to the creation of bilateral dependence which it 
creates between two otherwise independent actors.  Tenant-farmers and landowners are initially 
independent agents; however, once they make specialized investments to support the bioenergy 
farm lease (for instance, if the farmer purchases a harvester made to harvest Miscanthus), the 
farmer and the landowner become bilaterally dependent on one another, as suggested by TCE.  
Ira Altman & Thomas Johnson, The Choice of Organizational Form as a Non-Technical Barrier 
to Agro-Bioenergy Industry Development, 32 BIOMASS & BIOENERGY 28, 31 (2008).   
 26. Klein et al., supra note 23, at 285. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
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responding to change when coordinated adaptation is necessary.30  
Between these two poles lie a variety of “hybrid” governance 
structures, such as partial ownership arrangements and complex 
contracts.31  TCE suggests that when contractual hazards are posed, 
the parties to the exchange have an incentive to craft contract-specific 
safeguards, thereby realizing mutual gains.32  In circumstances in 
which the parties are unable to mitigate a hazard, pricing mechanisms 
will allocate the risk.33 
The emerging bioenergy economy provides an opportunity to 
implement TCE principles within the landlord-tenant relationship.  
Neither spot markets34 nor full-scale, fully integrated firms currently 
exist to frame standard agricultural contracts within the bioenergy 
sphere.35  Tenant-farmers of bioenergy crops must use a hybrid 
governance structure, in the form of the bioenergy farm lease 
described below, to improve the traditional contract structures 
developed within the commodity agricultural economy.  Traditional 
agricultural leases contain few terms and rely on the law to provide 
default rules that both parties find agreeable.  The parties to the 
bioenergy farm lease have an opportunity to create a governance 
structure that re-envisions the traditional annual agricultural lease 
and restructures the landlord-tenant relationship to reflect the 
novelties of perennial energy crop production.  Re-conceptualizing 
the landlord-tenant relationship as a governance structure rather than 
a mere contract for the lease of land resolves the problems posed to 
bioenergy crops by the current default rules for annual farmland 
leases. 
 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: An Introduction 5 (Kiel Institute 
for the World Economy, Economics Discussion Papers, No. 2007-3) [hereinafter Williamson, 
An Introduction], available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web 
&cd=2&ved=0CDIQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.economicsejournal.org%2Feconomics
%2Fdiscussionpapers%2F20073%2Fcount&ei=biiJUur1FcWT2gXstoGwCw&usg=AFQjCNH9
d3FoAgbfHsvjlEQDr2WKMLVEqQ&sig2=gICaKHNMbrybzAY-DaOtvg&bvm=bv.56643336, 
d.b2I. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Endres et al., supra note 12, at 80. 
 35. Furthermore, three quarters of the current bioenergy industry relies on vertical 
integration for fuel procurement, so “the prediction of spot markets being efficient for future 
biomass industries is difficult to justify with current data.”  See Ira Altman & Thomas Johnson, 
Organization of the Current U.S. Biopower Industry: A Template for Future Bioenergy 
Industries, 33 BIOMASS & BIOENERGY 779, 784 (2009) (suggesting that spot markets are 
unlikely to develop for the biomass industry).  
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B. Classical Contracting Theory 
The novelty of bioenergy farm leasing is evident when analyzing 
the paradigm established by CCT.  For instance, CCT considers the 
identities of the parties to a transaction irrelevant.36  CCT demands 
careful delineation of contract terms and holds that more formal 
features of the contract control when formal (e.g., written) and 
informal (e.g., oral) terms are contested.37  Furthermore, CCT 
suggests that in ideal contracts, remedies are narrowly arranged and 
third-party participation is discouraged.38  CCT concludes that long-
term contracts executed under conditions of uncertainty, such as 
those created in an emerging economic sector, are prohibitively costly 
and nearly impossible to design.39 
Bioenergy farm leases fail to align with this framework.  The 
identity of the parties to the transaction is highly relevant due to their 
specialized roles.  Third party participation, as we will elaborate upon 
later, is likely necessary for the transaction to be successful.  And, 
perhaps most significantly, perennial energy crops require a large 
initial investment40 and a long establishment period41—characteristics 
that require multiyear lease agreements in order to provide an 
adequate return on investment. 
Additionally, because farmers and landowners often engage in 
oral agreements to lease land, the terms of a contract are often 
 
 36. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 236 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson, The Governance of 
Contractual Relations]. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.   
 39. Id. at 237. 
 40. See Joseph Dolginow & Ray Massey, Switchgrass and Miscanthus: Economics of 
Perennial Grasses Grown for Bioenergy, U. OF MO. EXTENSION (Oct. 2013), http://extension. 
missouri.edu/p/G4980#Basic (estimating that income over total cost per acre of a switchgrass or 
Miscanthus plot is not positive until years 3–5).  Planting material alone for giant miscanthus can 
cost $1,000 to $10,000 per acre. Emily A. Heaton et al., Miscanthus (Miscanthus × giganteus) for 
Biofuel Production, U. OF ILL. EXTENSION, http://www.extension. org/pages/26625/miscanthus-
miscanthus-x-giganteus-for-biofuel-production#.UokphKWHoYU. 
 41. See Feng Song, Jinhua Zhao & Scott M. Swinton, Switching to Perennial Energy Crops 
Under Uncertainty and Costly Reversibility, 93 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 768, 768–69 (2011) (“[A]ll 
of the major cellulosic energy crop contenders are perennial. They need several years to 
establish before achieving full yield potential . . . .  Devoting land to energy crops represents a 
long-term commitment by the farmer and incurs sunk costs. Moreover, converting land back to 
traditional annual crops also incurs (possibly substantial) costs (e.g., costs of killing persistent 
perennial rootstock).”) (citing David S. Powlson, Andrew B. Riche & Ian Shield, Biofuels and 
Other Approaches for Decreasing Fossil Fuel Emissions from Agriculture, 146 ANNALS APPLIED 
BIOLOGY 193, 193–201 (2005)).  
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minimal.  Instead of relying on written terms, the parties rely on the 
default rules provided by state law to address their interests.  
However, the default rules used to ensure fairness in farm leases for 
traditional crops are insufficient to protect the interests of the tenant-
farmer and the landowner in leases for energy crop production. 
Bioenergy farm leases are not unique in their failure to align with 
CCT, and TCE scholars have long noted the benefits of long-term 
contracts in specific sectors.  Keith Crocker and Scott Masten, for 
instance, found that contracts in the natural gas industry tend to cover 
longer terms when specific assets are involved.42  In a study of bulk 
shipping, Stephen Pirrong argued that long-term contracts can be 
efficient in the presence of relatively small contracting hazards, even 
when obvious physical, human, and site asset specificities are absent.43 
The challenges presented in the natural gas and the bulk shipping 
industries are no more complex than those in the bioenergy sector; 
and the successful models implemented in those industries can be 
adopted to fit within the bioenergy sector.  The commonality of these 
successful long-term contracts is their incompleteness.  Significantly, 
the criticisms levied by CCT against long-term contracts—that they 
are impossible to fully design and completely enforce—are the same 
characteristics that TCE touts.44  TCE holds that all complex contracts 
are necessarily incomplete;45 one basic insight of TCE is that it is not 
feasible for parties to write complete contracts specifying the parties’ 
respective rights and obligations under all possible future 
contingencies.46  Rather, parties will often go to considerable lengths 
to craft contractual provisions—governance schemes—so as to reduce 
the prospect of future disagreement.47 
TCE better captures the complex needs of a bioenergy farm 
lease.  It allows the tenant-farmer and the landowner to agree 
beforehand on how they will approach a variety of situations which 
they may encounter, through negotiating additional terms into the 
lease.  The remainder of this paper will explain three ways in which 
 
 42. Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral 
Options and Contract Length, 19 RAND J. ECON. 327, 341 (1988). 
 43. Stephen Craig Pirrong, Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 937, 938 (1993). 
 44. Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost 
Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335, 347 (1995). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Edward F. Sherry & David J. Teece, Contactual Hazards and Long-Term Contracting: 
A TCE View from the Petroleum Industry, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 931, 933 (2004).  
 47. Id.  
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TCE can improve the traditional lease so that the lease will best 
satisfy the goals of both the tenant-farmer and the landholder when 
the land will be used for bioenergy crop production. 
III. RE-ENVISIONING THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP: 
THREE KEY TERMS 
Energy crops differ substantially from traditional crops grown on 
farms in the United States.  The leases between tenant-farmers and 
landowners should account for these differences.  These leases can be 
improved in three significant ways.  First, they can have provisions 
extending the lease beyond the term of the ordinary farm lease.  
Second, they can contain clauses which will define the responsibilities 
of each party with regard to mitigating and responding to the 
potential invasiveness of the bioenergy crops.  Finally, they can define 
the conditions under which each party is entitled to keep the 
rhizomes produced by the bioenergy crop and the conditions under 
which each party will be required to clean these rhizomes from the 
land. 
A. Multiyear Leasing Provisions 
Perennial energy crops require a significant initial investment 
and establishment period.48 As such, tenant-farmers are likely to grow 
such crops only under multiyear lease agreements.  The Statute of 
Frauds requires written confirmation of any agreement that cannot be 
performed in one year.49  In an industry where oral agreements are 
the norm, this precludes the formation of multi-year contracts unless 
the parties put their agreement in writing.  The Statute of Frauds 
therefore allows the landowner to prematurely terminate the tenant-
 
 48. Dolginow et al., supra note 40, at 1. 
 49. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 138 (1981) 
(discussing unenforceability of contracts); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80 / 2 (1983) (“No action shall 
be brought to charge any person upon contract for sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments or 
any interest in or concerning them, for a longer term than one year, unless such contract or 
some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged 
therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized in writing, signed by such 
party.”).  In order to satisfy the writing requirements of the statute of frauds, all jurisdictions 
apply the general contract rule that the writing must contain all the material terms of the 
agreement.  NEIL E. HARL, AGRICULTURAL LAW § 121.04[1][a][i] (2010) (citing Bills v. Fruge, 
360 So. 2d 661 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Hoke v. Brown, 448 P.2d 483 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968); 
McClellan v. Britain, 826 P.2d 245 (Wyo. 1992)).  Precisely what terms are material to the lease 
varies among jurisdictions.  For instance, in Wisconsin, the essential elements of a lease are set 
out in statute: a lease must be signed by the parties, identify the premises, specify the duration 
of the lease, and state the rent to by paid.  WIS. STAT. § 704.03 (2012). 
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farmer’s access to the bioenergy crops. 
A number of states have rules in place intended to protect 
tenant-farmers from the harsh dictates of the Statute of Frauds.  For 
example, a tenant-farmer in Illinois must receive at least four months’ 
notice prior to the end of the lease in order to terminate a year-to-
year lease.50  These farm leasing arrangement default interpretations 
have not yet evolved to protect the interests of the parties to a 
bioenergy farm lease.  While four months’ notice is adequate for 
farmers of annual crops, it would be cold comfort to a farmer who 
had sunk a substantial financial interest into establishing perennial 
biomass crops on the land.  Thus, multiyear, written lease agreements 
are an essential element of perennial bioenergy crop production; one 
that stands in stark contrast to the annual nature of most farmland 
rental agreements. 
A multiyear agreement is not only essential to the production of 
perennial bioenergy crops, it also benefits both parties involved.  
Both parties benefit from the low transaction costs that accompany a 
longer term deal, as opposed to the high transaction costs associated 
with re-negotiating the lease year after year.  Additionally, the parties 
reap the benefits provided by growing perennial bioenergy crops.  
Farmers benefit from the opportunity to grow a crop which requires 
little fertilizer and irrigation without facing a large risk of losing their 
initial investments.  Landowners benefit because perennial bioenergy 
crops improve soil health.51 
 
 50. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 9-206 (2013) (“Subject to the provisions of Section 16 of the 
Landlord and Tenant Act, in order to terminate tenancies from year to year of farm lands, 
occupied on a crop share, livestock share, cash rent or other rental basis, the notice to quit shall 
be given in writing not less than 4 months prior to the end of the year of letting. Such notice may 
not be waived in a verbal lease.”).   Other jurisdictions have instituted legislation limiting the 
ability of parties to cancel contracts which required a substantial financial obligation by one 
party, thereby creating an expectation of renewal.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 17.92 (2013) (“A 
contractor must not terminate or cancel a contract that requires a producer of agricultural 
commodities to make a capital investment in buildings or equipment that cost $100,000 or more 
and have a useful life of five or more years until: (1) the producer has been given written notice 
of the intention to terminate or cancel the contract at least 180 days before the effective date of 
the termination or cancellation . . . ; and (2) the producer has been reimbursed for damages 
incurred by an investment in buildings or equipment that was made for the purpose of meeting 
minimum requirements of the contract.”).  Similar legislation could be drafted to protect tenant-
farmers who have made large financial investments from having farm leases terminated by 
landowners. 
 51. Melissa K. Lynes et al., Determining Farmers’ Willingness To Grow Cellulosic Biofuel 
Feedstocks on Agricultural Land 6 (Aug. 2012) (citing Richard J. Hess et al., Corn Stover 
Availability for Biomass Conversion: Situation Analysis, 16 CELLULOSE 559–619 (2009)), 
available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/124777/2/LynesEtAlRev.pdf.6.  Perennial 
crops can contribute to increased soil carbon and nitrogen stocks.  These are factors that 
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TCE suggests that when a contractual hazard is posed—for 
instance, the necessity of a long lease term—the parties have an 
incentive to craft contract-specific safeguards.52  Under TCE the 
contract should create a governance scheme that accounts for the 
risks associated with bioenergy crops through contractual 
mechanisms such as the termination clauses discussed below.  
Negotiating this governance structure is necessary to protect both 
parties’ interests.  The negotiation also allows the parties to confront 
further concerns they may have regarding conversion of land from 
annual commodity crop production to perennial energy crop 
production. 
A recent focus group conducted by researchers at the University 
of Illinois illustrated some of these underlying trepidations.  The 
researchers utilized survey methods and a Geographic Information 
System-aided focus group in order to determine farmers’ perspectives 
on growing perennial energy grasses in central Illinois.53  Two issues 
raised by several participants related to the contingency of cropping 
decisions and the necessity of obtaining the landowner’s pre-approval 
to plant energy grasses.54  The contracting process for multiyear leases 
partially assuages these concerns because it creates an opportunity for 
farmers and landowners to discuss the profitability and agronomic 
practices associated with dedicated energy crops. 
Study participants also noted that even when landowners are 
amenable to planting biofuel crops, taking land out of traditional crop 
cultivation for this use goes against the grain of established farming 
practices and might place the owner at risk of being considered overly 
progressive.55  The process of developing multiyear lease agreements 
speaks to this concern.  The creation of a multiyear lease 
demonstrates to the community that the landowner is engaged in a 
lasting commercial venture, rather than in an experiment.56 
 
improve quality of land in a way that landowners will appreciate (particularly landowners who 
rent their land—”[s]ociological and economic studies indicate that land tenure security, while 
not the only factor, is directly related to the adoption of conservation practices on agricultural 
land.  The theory is that tenants do not have as much of a long-term interest in the land, so their 
motivation for conservation investments is limited”).  Cox, supra note 15, at 371 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 52. Williamson, An Introduction, supra note 32, at 5.  
 53. Cope et al., supra note 7, at 855–56. 
 54. Id. at 858. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Furthermore, community expectations could be a powerful mechanism for keeping 
landowners in such arrangements, as “[p]eer expectations of continued commitment or personal 
support and encouragement will reinforce commitment and provide a buffer against setbacks.”  
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The long-term nature of the lease also raises economic concerns.  
For landowners, one of the primary reservations to engaging in 
multiyear lease arrangements is a perceived inability to adjust the 
rent on a yearly basis.57  Changes in the prices of commodities and 
land values over time may result in rental payments substantially 
below alternative land production value.58  In other words, a 
landowner may reason that the opportunity cost of such a lease is too 
high.  A more nuanced approach can alleviate these market concerns 
by allowing for yearly adjustments to rental payments over the life of 
the lease.59  For instance, the parties could agree to renegotiate some 
contract terms, including rent, each year, perhaps subject to annual 
percentage-change limitations.  Alternatively, the parties could agree 
to allow a neutral third party such as a certified appraiser to 
determine the rent.60 
The parties could also agree to a “flex lease” arrangement, a cash 
lease tailored to automatically adjust to changing price scenarios.61  
Many potential measures of price and yield could be used in flex lease 
arrangements, including the price of a selected crop or multiple crops 
to create a pricing index to approximate the current fair market 
value.62  Landowners using flex lease agreements may feel more 
comfortable in a long-term arrangement because they can hedge their 
risk of declining rental payments against the various opportunity costs 
associated with leasing to farmers of more traditional annual row 
crops. 
Landowners may also be concerned that multiyear lease 
agreements put farm marketability at risk because a properly 
 
David J. Pannell et al., Understanding and Promoting Adoption of Conservation Practices by 
Rural Landowners, 46 AUSTL. J. EXPERIMENTAL AGRIC. 1407, 1411 (2006) (citing IRVING L. 
JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, 
CHOICE AND COMMITMENT 280–83 (1977)).  
 57. Edward Cox, A Lease-Based Approach to Sustainable Farming, Part II: Farm Tenancy 
Trends and the Outlook for Sustainability on Rented Land, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 5, 13 (2011). 
 58. Id.  
 59. As stated by one researcher, the fundamental issue with long-term contracts is 
credibility.  To achieve credibility, the contract must incorporate foreseeable renegotiation into 
the initial contract, allowing the parties to acquire new information over time, which will flavor 
the terms of the renegotiation.  Alexander et al., supra note 22, at 977.  In other words, not only 
does allowing for renegotiation of the rental payments over the course of a long-term contract 
make the landlord more likely to enter such a contract in the first place, it adds credibility to the 
contract, which could encourage the landowner to remain in the contract.  
 60. Cox, supra note 15, at 14.  
 61. Donald L. Uchtmann & A. Bryan Endres, Illinois Farm Leases: One Variable Cash 
Rent Option, AGRIC. L. & TAX’N BRIEFS 1, 1 (2008).  
 62. Id. 
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recorded lease subjects any subsequent purchasers of the land to its 
terms.63  However, a re-envisioned bioenergy farm lease can contain 
provisions that address early termination, such as inclusion of a 
predetermined fee to be paid to the tenant in the event of a sale. 
Marketability is particularly illustrative of the tension between a 
landowner’s desire for flexibility in exiting leases and a tenant-
farmer’s desire for land tenure security when growing perennial 
energy crops.  This tension is understandable.  The risk for perennial 
energy crop farmers is highest during the beginning of the lease, when 
they have heavily invested in the crop but have not yet harvested 
biomass.64  For landowners in a fixed long-term lease, the risk is 
greater in later stages as potential opportunity costs accumulate.65  To 
reduce this tension, farmers and landowners may incorporate 
formulaic termination clauses into their leases that place pressure on 
the parties to remain in a lease over the long-term.  These clauses can 
also provide flexiblity in exiting the lease should certain 
circumstances arise.  The termination clause options can be 
envisioned as fitting into one of two different contracts.  The first is a 
multiyear leasing contract, with the formulaic termination clause 
functioning as a buy-out provision.  The alternative is a yearly lease 
agreeement, with each party having the option of renewing the lease 
for the following year, and the decision to renew (or not) determines 
the parties’ rights and obligations under the long-term agreement.66  
The key is to disencentivize lease termination, but not impose 
measures so draconian as to unnecessarily tie parties to a sub-optimal 
contract in this novel bioeconomy. 
Based on our analysis of agricultural contracts, the critical issues 
to balance include the cost of establishing the perennial biomass crop, 
 
 63. Cox, supra note 15, at 15. 
 64. While not the focus of this research, it should be noted that, for farmers, bioenergy 
farm leases are likely only one in a series of contracts that will enable their entry into the 
bioenergy market.  While the biomass industry is in its infancy and no standard contracting 
procedure has yet been established, scholars suggest that “[w]ith a large investment at stake in a 
cellulosic ethanol plant, the ethanol producer will want multi-year commitments from farmers 
to ensure a sufficient supply of biomass to operate the facility.”  L. Paul Goeringer, Harold L. 
Goodwin & Michael Popp, The New Fuel Frontier: Biomass Contracting, 5 KY. J. EQUINE, 
AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 71, 74 (2012–13) (footnote omitted).  Signing a multiyear 
agreement with an ethanol plant may suggest that tenant-farmers (who do not have complete 
control over their ability to supply) are less likely to secure such contacts.  This is not so—
farmers can negotiate excuse of performance clauses into their contracts with the ethanol 
producer.  These clauses can stipulate that termination of a lease constitutes a valid excuse of 
performance.   
 65. Id. at 75. 
 66. Id. 
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the profit to date of the biomass farmer,67 and the cost of restoring the 
farm to its condition prior to planting the perennial crop68 (assuming 
the previous and subsequent production consists of annual row 
crops).  The result is a variable termination fee assessed to the party 
seeking to exit the agreement. 
As a starting point in this analysis, one can envision a scenario in 
which the biomass farmer seeks to exit the market before the end of 
the multiyear lease.  Perhaps the demand for biomass was lower than 
expected or he had other unanticipated complications.  When the 
tenant-farmer walks away from a multiyear lease intended for 
commodity production of annual crops such as corn or soybeans, 
relatively little cost is imposed on the landowner.  The landowner 
only has to deal with the hassle of finding a new tenant and 
negotiating new lease terms.  On the other hand, the nature of 
perenial crop production such as Miscanthus requires potentially 
substantial transition costs such as the effort required to remove the 
Miscanthus rhizomes69 and prepare the field for subsequent planting 
of annual crops in the next growing season.70  Thus, the terminating 
tenant-farmer should pay a fee equivalent to the cost of restoration.  
Likewise, if the failure to renew is a mutual decision, the landowner 
and the farmer should share restoration costs. 
If the landowner unilaterally fails to renew the lease, the 
distribution of various costs should adjust to account for the current 
situation within the larger life-span of the multiyear lease agreement.  
For example, the governance structure could dictate that if the 
farmer’s accumulated profits are less than the establishment costs of 
the crop, the landowner will pay the farmer a termination fee equal to 
the difference between the establishment costs and the farmer’s profit 
 
 67. In economics, profit represents the firm’s total revenue minus all the opportunity costs 
(both explicit and implicit) of producing the goods and services sold.  In accounting, profit 
represents total revenue minus the firm’s explicit costs. N. Gregory Mankiw, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS 270 (Jack W. Calhoun & Michael P. Roche eds., 3d ed. 2004).  For the purposes of 
the bioenergy farm lease, the parties are free to define profit however they wish within their 
contract—what is important is that theirs is a shared definition.  
 68. Id. 
 69. A rhizome is an underground stem capable of sending out both shoots and roots and 
functioning as a reproductive structure.  Rhizome Definition, BIOLOGY ONLINE, http://www. 
biology-online.org/dictionary/Rhizome (last modified Oct. 3, 2005). 
 70. Currently, there are no published experiments investigating Miscanthus removal.  Eric 
Anderson et al., Growth and Agronomy of Miscanthus × giganteus for Biomass Production, 2 
BIOFUELS 167, 175 (2011).  Accordingly, the cost of restoring a field to agricultural viability 
after the growth of Miscanthus is not well understood.  The parties may need to agree, 
therefore, that they will reimburse the other for the cost of restoration, rather than pay the 
restoration costs ex ante.  
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at the time of lease nonrenewal.  Moreover, the landowner would 
bear the full cost of restoration.  However, if failure to renew the 
lease occurs when the farmer’s profits are equal to or greater than the 
establishment costs—most likely in the outer years of the multiyear 
lease—the landowner will only bear responsibility for restoration. 
This approach takes into account the agronomic properties of the 
particular perennial energy crop, and allows the farmer to bear 
restoration costs should a crop grow for its entire life cycle.  Imagine 
that a landowner and a farmer are drafting a lease for the growth of 
switchgrass, a crop thought to be capable of harvest for 10 to 12 
years.71  The formulaic termination clause could read: 
 
If Farmer fails to renew the lease, Farmer agrees to pay restoration 
costs.  If Landowner fails to renew the lease at a time when 
Farmer’s profits are less than Farmer’s establishment costs, 
Landowner agrees to pay Farmer the difference between the 
establishment costs and Farmer’s profit at the time the lease failed 
to be renewed, and Landowner agrees to pay restoration costs.  If 
Landowner fails to renew the lease and Farmer’s profits are equal 
to or greater than Farmer’s establishment costs, Landowner agrees 
to pay the restoration costs.  If the failure to renew is a mutual 
decision, Landowner and Farmer will share restoration costs.  
Should the lease tenure last for 10 years or more, Farmer agrees to 
pay restoration costs. 
 
Shifting the termination fees presents a reinterpretation of the 
traditionally strict view of contract breach and associated 
responsibilities.  However, this change may represent an adjustment 
necessary to incentivize the long-term lease provisions required for 
widespread production of perennial biomass to meet renewable 
energy mandates.  These terms add certainty to the governance 
scheme of the bioenergy farm lease and have the residual benefit of 
fostering open and frequent communication between the landowner 
and the land operator.  Lack of communication between landowners 
and tenant-farmers undermines tenant-farmers’ capacity to adopt 
sustainable farming practices.72  A contract that encourages, or even 
requires, open communication between landowners and their tenants 
will only benefit the health of the farmland. 
 
 71. Kate Withers, Growing the Future: Switchgrass Management for Ethanol, EXTENSION 
BULLETIN E-3078 1, 2 (Mich. State U. Sept. 2009).  
 72. Cox, supra note 15, at 381. 
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B. Invasiveness Concerns 
Another objection landowner may have to renting to perennial 
energy crop farmers—besides just entering into long-term lease 
agreements—is the risk of crop invasion by perennial energy crops.  
The current interest in biofuels has our nation’s scientists looking for 
plant species capable of increased biomass production, which requires 
“traits such as rapid growth, the ability to outcompete local 
vegetation, prolific seed production, increased tolerance to a variety 
of soils and climatic conditions, a strong resistance to plant pests and 
diseases, and a lack of predators in the recipient ecosystem.”73  These 
are traits shared by many invasive plant species, a fact that has some 
concerned about the risk of perennial energy crops becoming invasive 
within their targeted ecosystems.74 
These concerns are not unfounded.  Many purportedly beneficial 
introduced species have created long-term economic and 
environmental costs due to their invasiveness.75  Kudzu, the so-called 
“vine that ate the south,” was purposefully introduced to the United 
States for use as a forage crop76 and has caused enormous economic 
damage; estimated by some to be as high as $500 million per year.77  
Sorghum halepense, an introduced forage grass, is invasive in 16 
states.78  The most conservative estimates of competitive losses for 
cotton and soybean crops as a result of this invasion exceed $30 
 
 73. James S. Neal McCubbins et al., Frayed Seams in the “Patchwork Quilt” of American 
Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of Invasive Plant Species Regulation, 43 ENVTL. L. 35, 39–40 
(2013) (citing Jacob N. Barney & Joseph M. DiTomaso, Nonnative Species and Bioenergy: Are 
We Cultivating the Next Invader?, 58 BIOSCIENCE 64, 64 (2008); Joseph M. DiTomaso et al., 
Biofuel vs. Bioinvasion: Seeding Policy Priorities, 44 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 6906, 6907 (2010)). 
 74. See Sathyamurthy Raghu et al., Adding Biofuels to the Invasive Species Fire?, 313 SCI. 
1742 (2006) (“Balancing costs and benefits of species introductions is a key contemporary 
challenge. Introducing some plant species as biofuel sources may be safe, but safety must be 
established by agronomic and ecological analyses . . . .  Experts must assess ecological risks 
before introducing biofuel crops, to ensure that we do not add biofuels to the already raging 
invasive species fire.”). 
 75. See John J. Ewel et al., Deliberate Introductions of Species: Research Needs, 49 
BIOSCIENCE 619 (1999) (“Introductions of nonindigenous organisms can be both a boon and a 
bane to society.”). 
 76. Karen Ray, Are Biofuel Crops the Next Kudzu?, 17 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 247, 
247 (2008) (citing Theo Emery, In Tennessee, Goats Eat the “Vine that Ate The South,” N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2007; Amanda Allen, Kudzu in Appalachia, in ASPI TECHNICAL SERIES TP 55 
(Al Fritsch ed., 2000)). 
 77. Richard J. Blaustein, Kudzu’s Invasion into Southern United States Life and Culture, in 
THE GREAT RESHUFFLING: HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF INVASIVE SPECIES, 55, 60 (J.A. McNeeley 
ed., 2001) (citing James H. Miller, Kudzu Management Program: Containing the Spread and 
Reclaiming Lands (2000) (paper e-mailed by Dr. Miller to R. Blaustein)). 
 78. Raghu et al., supra note 74, at 1742. 
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million annually in just three of those states.79 
How can “the economic benefits of growing nonnative crops for 
bio-based energy” outweigh the concern of “cultivating the next 
noxious weed or invasive plant?”80  Discussions for resolving this 
quandary typically revolve around large-scale policy reforms.81  
Research suggests, however, that such schemes are ineffectual; 
despite the enormous cost to the U.S. associated with invasive 
plants,82 invasive species affecting nonagricultural landscapes are 
largely unregulated by states or by the federal government.83 
Noticeably absent in both scientific and policy literature is a 
consideration of the landowners’ ability to protect their property 
from the risk of invasive species spread through private contracting 
and through the creation of governance structures.  The bioenergy 
farm lease can be tailored to minimize a landowner’s risk of invasion.  
Approximately 40% of agricultural land in the United States is 
farmed by someone other than the owner.84  Bioenergy farm leases 
could provide an important tool in the protection of agricultural 
landscapes because of their root structures which create healthy soil 
and reduce erosion.85 
Furthermore, TCE suggests that transaction-specific governance 
 
 79. Id. (citing Chester G. McWhorter, A 16-Yr Survey on Levels of Johnsongrass (Sorghum 
halepense) in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, 41 WEED SCI. 669, 669 (1993)). 
 80. Jacob N. Barney & Joseph M. DiTomaso, Nonnative Species and Bioenergy: Are We 
Cultivating the Next Invader?, 58 BIOSCIENCE 64, 65 (2008). 
 81. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INVASIVE SPECIES: CLEARER FOCUS 
AND GREATER COMMITMENT NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE THE PROBLEM (Oct. 2002) 
(recommending reform efforts to better manage invasive species), available at www.gao.gov/ 
assets/240/236162.pdf. 
 82. See David Pimentel, Rodolfo Zuniga & Doug Morrison, Update on the Environmental 
and Economic Costs Associated with Alien-Invasive Species in the United States, 52 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 273, 273 (2005) (citing study reporting $97 billion in damages from 1906 to 
1991). 
 83. See Lauren D. Quinn et al., Navigating the “Noxious” and “Invasive” Regulatory 
Landscape: Suggestions for Improved Regulation, 63 BIOSCIENCE 124 (2013) (citing Pimentel et 
al., supra note 82, at 273–88) (“Nonagricultural invasive plants cost the U.S. economy more than 
$7.7 billion annually in income losses . . . and control expenditures . . . .  Although these 
environmental and economic consequences are substantial, invasive species affecting 
nonagricultural landscapes are largely unregulated by states or federal agencies.”).  
 84. Cox, supra note 15, at 372 (citing NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERVICE, USDA, PERCENT OF 
LAND IN FARMS RENTED OR LEASED: 2007 (2007)). 
 85. Very small-scale eradication need not require enormous resources.  The determination 
of a single person or small nongovernmental organization may even suffice.  Daniel Simberloff, 
Eradication—Preventing Invasions at the Outset, 51 WEED SCI. 247, 248 (2003), available at 
http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1614/0043-1745%282003%29051%5B0247%3AEPIATO%5D 
2.0.CO %3B2. 
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structures are more likely to be fully developed in transactions 
executed under greater uncertainty.86  The potential invasiveness of a 
number of proposed bioenergy feedstocks creates uncertainty within 
the bioenergy farm lease in at least two ways.  First, legislators may 
deem the bioenergy feedstock to be noxious or invasive during the 
lease term, and thus the contract would have to be terminated.  
Second, the bioenergy feedstock may escape from the proposed plot, 
thus exposing the tenant-farmer and/or the landowner to liability.  
Accordingly, this inherent contractual uncertainty should be resolved 
through transaction-specific governance structures within the 
contract. 
Implementing carefully drafted written agreements can lower the 
risk of invasion.  Such an agreement will assuage the concerns of both 
the tenant farmer and the landowner before invasiveness becomes a 
problem and thus incentivize more farmers and more landowners to 
participate in this nascent industry.  The rest of this section will  
suggest how prudent landowners can negotiate to mediate these risks 
by  (1) establishing ways to determine if an invasion has occurred, (2) 
specifying agronomic practices to reduce the risk of such an invasion, 
and (3) articulating the parties’ responsibilities once an invasion has 
been identified.87 
1. Establishing that an Invasion Has Occurred 
Well-crafted bioenergy farm leases will include a term that 
stipulates when invasive species spread is considered to have 
occurred.  A lease-term that adequately analyzes invasiveness will 
clearly define three factors: (a) who determines whether an invasion 
has occurred, (b) when that determination will take place, and (c) 
what parameters will be used to determine whether or not an invasion 
 
 86. Williamson, The Governance of Contractual Relations, supra note 36, at 254. 
 87. Many states create an affirmative duty for a landowner, a tenant-farmer, or a state 
department (this varies by state) to eradicate or take other control measures in the event that 
noxious weeds be discovered on the property by the appropriate government agency.  In 
Illinois, for instance, if an individual in possession of a property (landowner or tenant) has 
allowed noxious weeds to grow, the Control Authority is permitted, after notifying the 
caretaker of the property, to implement proper control and eradication methods on the 
property.  505 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100 / 10 (1972).  Landowners still have an interest in 
contracting to protect against invasion for a number of reasons: (1) these duties relate to 
noxious weeds, which are considered by many to be not well regulated, see Quinn et al., supra 
note 83, at 125 (discussing problems with state and federal regulations); (2) if the state’s 
regulations require that the landowner re-enter the property to control the invasion, the 
landowner has an interest in contracting this duty away to the tenant, because the tenant is the 
least cost avoider. 
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has occurred. 
A neutral third party should ideally determine whether an 
invasion has occurred because other factors in the lease might 
incentivize a party to either ignore invasive species spread or be too 
eager to find an invasion.  Consider, for instance, a contract that 
requires a farmer to eradicate the entirety of his crop or engage in 
other costly control measures if an invasion was found to have 
occurred.  A farmer in this position would be hesitant to acknowledge 
such an invasion.  The landowner, by contrast, seeking to terminate 
the lease for other reasons might have an opposite bias.  Accordingly, 
the contract should require that a third party determine whether an 
invasion has occurred.  This third party could be another local farmer 
or landowner; an extension agent; or, if bioenergy farm leases become 
widespread, a consulting agency could be created to make these 
determinations.  The contract also should specify who would pay for 
the evaluation. 
In addition to who should determine if an invasion has occurred, 
leases should define when and how often this determination should 
be made.  Due to the multiyear nature of the agreements, lease terms 
could require that an invasion inspection be made on the date of 
renewal each year.  The date of the inspection could also relate to the 
agronomic properties of a specific plant.  For instance, if the tenant-
farmer is growing Miscanthus, which develops shoots each spring,88 
the inspection date could occur at a specified time in late spring. 
Ideally, the contract would also identify precisely what 
constitutes an invasion.  Specificity is necessary because of the lack of 
consensus over terminological concepts within the field of invasion 
ecology.89  The parties are unlikely to have a common conception of 
what constitutes an invasion, as even the scientific community 
struggles to agree.90  The contract could define an invasion as an 
unapproved plant appearing outside of a specified area, or as the 
bioenergy crop appearing within a defined radius.  A temporal 
 
 88. Dudley G. Christian, Andrew B. Riche & Nicola E. Yates, Growth, Yield, and Mineral 
Content of Miscanthus × giganteus Grown as a Biofuel for 14 Successive Harvests, 28 INDUS. 
CROPS & PRODUCTS 320, 321 (2008). 
 89. See David M. Richardson et al., Naturalization and Invasion of Alien Plants: Concepts 
and Definitions, 6 DIVERSITY & DISTRIBUTIONS 93 (2000) (“The expanding field of invasion 
ecology has seen a proliferation of terms to describe various concepts.  There has also been 
considerable confusion and misuse of existing terminology.”). 
 90. See Lauren D. Quinn et al., Resolving Regulatory Uncertainty: Legislative Language for 
Potentially Invasive Bioenergy Feedstocks, GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY BIOENERGY (2014) 
(discussing different states’ invasion terminology). 
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element may be necessary in this analysis—for instance, the farmer’s 
responsibilities under the contract could terminate at the end of the 
lease term, or the farmer could have duties to the landowner that 
extend beyond the lease term.  The contract should clearly state what 
constitutes an invasion because the measures taken to avoid an 
invasion and the responsibilities of the parties once an invasion has 
occurred are dependent upon that determination. 
2. Reducing the Risk of Invasion 
Landowners should insist on provisions that reduce invasion 
risks.  The two best options are an “improved” good husbandry clause 
or a variety selection clause, both of which would further strengthen 
the governance scheme of the bioenergy farm lease. 
A good husbandry clause establishes a duty to protect the farm’s 
productivity and to prevent waste.  These clauses are often included 
in form farmland leases, which have language creating a duty for 
tenants to farm the leased land in a manner consistent with a general 
standard of good husbandry.91  The precise words used to establish 
this standard often vary, as does the context in which the standard is 
created.92  Without modification, good husbandry clauses do not 
sufficiently protect landowners’ interests against invasive species, as 
good husbandry clauses are generally not read to include a duty to 
engage in practices to prevent species invasion.  Landowners can 
better protect their property by privately contracting for specific 
expectations regarding invasive species spread rather than relying on 
a vague good husbandry clause and noxious weed regulations. 
An “improved” good husbandry clause would require specific 
conservation standards or methods to better protect landowner 
interests.  An “improved” good husbandry clause that establishes the 
expectations regarding the possibility of and expected treatment for 
invasion could read: 
 
The Tenant will farm in accordance with the highest standards of 
good husbandry and will take all first-class, farmer-like steps to 
ensure the conservation of the natural resources and the long-term 
productivity of the farm.  This includes taking measures to protect 
against the possibility of invasion by the energy crop and pledging 
to take measures to eradicate the plant should such an invasion 
take place. 
 
 91. Cox, supra note 15, at 24. 
 92. Id. at 24–25. 
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As a starting point, these “improved” clauses should incorporate 
the regulations and recommendations of relevant federal agencies, 
such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s recommendations 
regarding the prevention of invasion.93  Surprisingly, federal 
regulations and recommendations are rarely referenced in the good 
husbandry clauses currently in use.  For example, an “improved” 
good husbandry clause could contain the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service’s recommendations for preventing the 
unintentional spread of Miscanthus.  These recommendations include 
establishing and maintaining a minimum 25-foot setback or border 
around a Miscanthus stand to allow for monitoring and management 
of any spread; covering or otherwise containing vegetative planting 
material during transportation; and a prohibition against disposing 
excess live planting material at the edges of fields, in field borders, in 
farm trash piles, or in landfills.94 A good husbandry clause that 
incorporates crop-specific recommendations would better protect the 
property from invasion and the landowner and tenant-farmer from 
legal liability.  Edward Cox observed that good husbandry clauses 
sometimes focus more on productivity than evolving stewardship 
standards, ignoring sustainable practices and the risk of invasive 
species.95 
Incorporating federal regulations into a bioenergy farm lease—in 
other words, a more complete governance scheme—could allow 
independent tenant-farmers growing bioenergy crops without a 
standing purchasing contract to sell their biomass to fuel producers.  
 
 93. An additional regulatory structure that should be included in “improved good 
husbandry clauses” is relevant Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations, including 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2) which relate to giant reed (Arundo donax) or Napier grass 
(Pennisetum purpureum).  The RSF2 regulations define what qualifies as advanced biofuels.  
EPA will only approve giant reed or napier grass crop production pathways if producers meet 
certain registration, recordkeeping, and reporting protocols designed to minimize the potential 
invasiveness of these crops.  Producers can only sell fuel that has been created under an 
approved pathway.  These precautionary steps are in addition to registration requirements 
unfolded in 40 C.F.R. 80.1450.  Requiring that farmers comply with EPA regulations will ensure 
that they manage the risk of invasion.  These requirements are placed on the fuel producer, but 
must be implemented by the biomass producer.  EPA acknowledges that the feedstock grower 
and the renewable fuel producer may be separate entities, but the comprehensive requirements 
conflate the parties.  At a minimum, the regulations require an intensely cohesive and 
communicative relationship that significantly predates the sale of biomass to the biofuel 
producer.   
 94. Nat. Resources Conservation Service, USDA, Planting and Managing Giant 
Miscanthus as a Biomass Energy Crop (Technical Note No. 4, 2011). 
 95. Cox, supra note 15, at 25. 
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Such an arrangement would benefit landowners by protecting their 
property from invasion.  The regulatory lease terms would also 
enable tenant-farmers to enter the bioeconomy by guaranteeing that 
their biomass follows the regulations to fuel producers seeking 
compliant sources.  Therefore, tenant-farmers growing crops to sell 
into the biomass supply chain may want to negotiate bioenergy farm 
leases that incorporate the documentation and registration required 
by federal regulation to certify that the crops qualify under federal 
energy regulations. 
Another option is the variety selection clause.  The lease may 
include a breed selection clause specifying the species and, if 
appropriate, the variety of plant permitted to be cultivated on the 
property.  For example, if the famer wishes to grow Miscanthus, the 
contract could stipulate that the farmer is only to grow the so-called 
Illinois clone on the property due to its sterile characteristics that 
reduce the potential for invasion. 
3. Articulating Responsibilities Once an Invasion Has Occurred 
These contracts must also define what constitutes eradication.  
Eradication is commonly understood to mean complete annihilation 
of a species within a given area96 and is used by lawmakers in this 
way.97  However, for some bioenergy species—like Miscanthus, which 
develops elaborate, nutrient-rich root systems—complete annihilation 
may be neither feasible nor advisable.  For example, Miscanthus did 
not reduce yields for glyphosate-resistant soybeans even though it 
was not completely eradicated.98 
Two additional definitions of eradication could be used in a 
bioenergy farm lease to absolve tenant-farmers from being burdened 
with unnecessary eradication responsibilities.  The first option is a 
procedure-based definition, which defines eradication as a series of 
accepted protocols.  The second is a results-based definition, which 
would hold the farmer liable for further eradication procedures or 
damages if the field is not returned to a healthy, productive state at 
the end of the lease tenure.  “Healthy and productive” could be 
 
 96. Merriam-Webster defines “eradicate” as “to do away with as completely as if by pulling 
up by the roots.”  Eradicate Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/eradicate (last visited May 9, 2014).  
 97. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-5.5-103 (2014) (defining eradication as “reducing the 
reproductive success of a noxious weed species or specified noxious weed population in largely 
uninfected regions to zero and permanently eliminating the species or population within a 
specified period of time”).  
 98. Anderson et al., supra note 70, at 175.  
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defined as distinct from a state of zero residual rhizomes. 
Once eradication is defined, bioenergy farm leases should 
articulate who will be responsible for completing the process.  There 
are a number of options available to landowners and farmers in this 
regard.  The lease could stipulate that the tenant-farmer must return 
the farm to the same condition as it was in when she took possession.  
Or, the landowner and farmer could stipulate that the farmer would 
pay the landowner for the cost of eradication.  Other alternatives 
include: placing the financial and physical responsibilities of 
eradication on the farmer entirely; an agreement among the parties to 
share the costs of eradication; or creating either an escrow account 
into which the farmer pays or a surety bond to cover eradication and 
restoration costs. 
The parties should also determine ex ante what is to happen after 
eradication is complete.  One option is for the lease to end at that 
time.  Another is for the terms of the lease to be renegotiated.  The 
options are several, but the take-away is singular: as TCE suggests, 
the parties to a bioenergy farm lease should include a transaction-
specific plan to determine if an invasion has occurred and a series of 
steps to restore the ecological and productive value of the land if an 
invasion has in fact occurred. 
C. Rhizome Reclamation and the Doctrine of Emblements 
A bioenergy farm lease must also navigate the novel area of 
rhizome reclamation.  Rhizomes are the means through which many 
bioenergy crops can be reproduced, and can thus be very valuable.  
However, they can be a nuisance if they are not removed.  Leases for 
land that will be used for the production of bioenergy crops that 
produce rhizomes should contain clauses defining the rights and 
responsibilities surrounding the rhizomes.  Specifically, these clauses 
should define both when tenant-farmers have the right to remove 
rhizomes from the farm and when tenant-farmers are required to 
harvest rhizomes, which would otherwise be a nuisance to the 
landowner. 
Miscanthus is sterile, and, as such, it is propagated vegetatively 
using micro-propagation of plantlets and macro-propagation of 
rhizomes.99  Plants produced from rhizome division have proven more 
 
 99. Richard Pyter et al., Agronomic Experiences with Miscanthus × Giganteus in Illinois, 
USA, 581 BIOFUELS: METHODS & PROTOCOLS 41, 45 (Jonathan R. Mielenz ed., 2009). 
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resistant to winter losses than those produced from plantlets,100 and 
rhizome recovery is currently the favored method of propagation in 
the U.S.101  Rhizome reclamation for subsequent planting or sale at 
the end of a lease term is a potentially profitable enterprise.  For 
instance, studies indicate that a three-year-old Miscanthus plant can 
produce 75-80 harvestable rhizomes,102 a hearty return on a farmer’s 
initial investment.  Both the farmer and the landowner will have a 
strong financial interest in determining the distribution of rhizomes at 
the end of the lease.103  As a practical matter, if the lease ends while 
the Miscanthus crop is still producing high yields of biomass, the 
landowner may wish to stipulate that some or all of the rhizomes 
remain on the property.  If the lease ends and the landowner is not 
interested in continuing to grow Miscanthus on the property, she will 
have an interest in the Miscanthus rhizomes being removed from the 
property to eradicate the crop.  Alternatively, a landowner may be 
interested in keeping some or all of the rhizomes on the property to 
sell them to a third party.104 
Common law conventions are not prepared to address the novel 
issue of rhizome reclamation.  The doctrine of emblements, a long 
recognized equitable remedy,105 illustrates the manner in which the 
common law fails to protect the interests of parties to a bioenergy 
farm lease.  The doctrine permits farmers to enter and leave the land 
for necessary purposes, not a right of possession, and the right must 
be exercised within a reasonable time after the tenancy has ended.106  
The doctrine also provides a tenant who holds farmland for an 
indeterminate period a right to remove from the land, after the 
 
 100. Id.  
 101. Christian et al., supra note 5, at 176. 
 102. Pyter et al., supra note 99, at 46.  But see TEAGASC & AGRI-FOOD & BIOSCIENCE 
INST., MISCANTHUS BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES (Barry Caslin, Dr. John Finnan & Dr. 
Lindsay Easson eds. 2010) (“Planted [Miscanthus] crop will have a rhizome multiplication factor 
of 15 after 4 years.”), available at http://www.afbini.gov.uk/miscanthus-best-practice-guidelines. 
pdf. 
 103. See TEAGASC et al., supra note 102, at 26 (discussing the value of remaining rhizomes).  
This discussion assumes that the farmer has autonomous ownership over the rhizomes at the 
beginning of the lease term, but this may not be the case—patented plant varieties may include 
end use restrictions as a condition of sale similar to contractual restrictions on the saving of 
patented soybean seeds.  
 104. Whether or not the rhizomes will be sellable is likely a factor of their age.  See Christian 
et al., supra note 5, at 176 (“The most successful establishment was achieved with rhizomes from 
5-year old plants where 88% of rhizome pieces produced ramets. In comparison, 52% of the 9-
year-old and 25% of the 1-year-old rhizome produced ramets.”). 
 105. Leigh v. Lynch, 493 N.E.2d 1040, 1042 (Ill. 1986). 
 106. Id.  
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termination of the tenancy, the emblements planted prior to the 
termination of the tenancy.107 
Traditionally, the doctrine of emblements only applied to fructus 
industriales, plants that must be sown each year in order to produce.  
In practice, courts limited application of the doctrine to crops such as 
wheat and corn.108  This traditional definition was deemed too 
restrictive in light of modern agricultural practices.109  Perennial plants 
may be classified as emblements under the modern construction of 
the doctrine if they require extensive cultivation each crop year.110  In 
1986, the Illinois Supreme Court specified crops such as hops, sugar 
cane, and some artificial grasses as potential emblements.111 
Because Miscanthus is a grass, the modern statement of the 
doctrine seems to include a farmer’s right to harvest Miscanthus 
biomass after the lease termination, so long as the other factors are 
met.112  But what about the potentially valuable rhizomes—does the 
doctrine of emblements allow for their harvest? 
While a court has yet to decide this question, the answer is most 
likely no.  Even the expanded modern interpretation of the doctrine 
does not seem to cover rhizomes.  The doctrine of emblements under 
the Restatement (First) of Property defines “annual crops” as both 
those that have to be placed in the ground each year, as well as those 
from which the yearly produce is principally the result of attention 
and care exerted in the same agricultural year.113  Miscanthus does not 
fit this definition because the biomass growing annually from the 
rhizome might be emblements, but the rhizome itself continues to 
grow year after year in a perennial manner.  Courts, therefore, are 
unlikely to grant tenants a right to post-lease rhizome reclamation 
under the doctrine of emblements. 
The lack of common law guidance for the distribution of 
rhizomes at the end of the lease terms suggests that the bioenergy 
farm lease is being executed under greater uncertainty than CCT was 
developed to manage.  As such, the parties must follow TCE by re-
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1043.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. HARL, supra note 49, § 121.05[1]  (“To exercise the doctrine of emblements, lessees 
must establish (1) an emblement is involved; (2) the lease authorizes the planting of the crop in 
question; (3) the lease in question is for an uncertain period; and (4) the termination of the lease 
was not caused by the lessee.”). 
 113. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 121 cmt. f (1936). 
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envisioning the traditional agricultural farm lease and creating a 
governance scheme internal to the contract.  One contractual 
mechanism that could be a powerful tool in such a governance 
structure is the good husbandry clause.114 
The good husbandry clause would not protect the farmer’s right 
to reclaim Miscanthus rhizomes, nor would it necessitate the removal 
of the rhizomes.  Good husbandry is often measured against the 
community’s common farming practices.  In this case, the growth of 
bioenergy crops is so new that there are no common farming practices 
to dictate the terms of such an arrangement.  However, landowners 
and tenant-farmers can craft “improved” good husbandry clauses that 
delineate the rhizome removal process.  These provisions would move 
beyond legal convention and require specific action.  A baseline 
clause could read: 
 
The Tenant will farm in accordance with the highest standards of 
good husbandry and will take all first-class farmer-like steps to 
ensure the conservation of the natural resources and the long-term 
productivity of the farm.  This includes removing the Miscanthus 
rhizomes from the property before the end of the lease tenure. 
 
Such provisions can be incorporated and expanded upon in farm 
leases to protect all parties’ interests. 
The formula for allocating contractual rights and responsibilities, 
described earlier in the context of early termination/failure to renew, 
could also determine the rights to rhizomes upon lease termination.  
For example, a farmer failing to renew the lease would, in addition to 
bearing the cost of restoration, forfeit the right to claim the rhizomes.  
If the failure to renew is a mutual decision, the landowner and the 
farmer would share both restoration costs and the right to harvest and 
dispose of the rhizomes.  If the landowner fails to renew the lease, the 
famer would have rights to the rhizomes as a contractual extension of 
the previously discussed common law doctrine of emblements.  These 
arrangements can even account for the particular agronomic 
properties of perennial energy crops.  If the lease were to run for the 
length of the plant’s life, the cost of restoration would be attributed to 
the tenant-farmer. 
A clause accounting for Miscanthus’ particular agronomic 
properties could read: 
 
 
 114. Cox, supra note 15, at 24. 
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If Farmer fails to renew the lease, Farmer agrees to pay the 
restoration costs and forfeits the right to claim the rhizomes.  If 
Landowner fails to renew the lease and Farmer’s profits are less 
than his establishment costs, Landowner agrees to pay Farmer the 
difference between the establishment costs and Farmer’s profit at 
the time the lease failed to be renewed, Landowner agrees to pay 
the restoration costs, and Farmer has a right to claim the rhizomes.  
If Landowner fails to renew the lease and Farmer’s profits are 
equal to or greater than Farmer’s establishment costs, Landowner 
agrees to pay the restoration costs and Farmer has a right to claim 
the rhizomes.  If the failure to renew is a mutual decision, 
Landowner and Farmer agree to share restoration costs and the 
right to claim the rhizomes. 
 
This clause effectively employs the TCE recommendation to 
negotiate a transaction-specific governance scheme to overcome a 
potential contractual hazard.  Inserting this formula into a bioenergy 
farm lease for Miscanthus ensures that the rhizomes will be equitably 
distributed upon termination of the lease. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The emerging bioenergy industry will require a tremendous 
amount of biomass.115  Because so much of U.S. farmland is leased, 
the success of the industry will depend predominantly on tenant-
farmers’ willingness to participate in biomass production.  Traditional 
agricultural leases—based on CCT principles such as short lease 
terms and minimal specificity—do not adequately protect the parties 
to bioenergy farm leases.  Fortunately, complex contracts can 
function as governance schemes that allow parties to navigate the 
intricacies inherent to growing bioenergy crops. 
For the parties to a bioenergy farm lease, potential conflicts 
include: the necessity of long-term leasing provisions; the potential 
invasiveness of some proposed bioenergy feedstocks; and the 
distribution of Miscanthus rhizomes at the end of a lease term.  Using 
the model provisions proposed in this article, the parties to a 
bioenergy farm lease can protect themselves from these potential 
hazards by re-envisioning traditional agricultural leases and 
restructuring such agreements to reflect the novelties of perennial 
energy crop production. 
While this article only discussed three ways in which TCE can 
 
 115. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 3, at 151–52 (discussing expected future 
needs for biomass).  
22_Scott & Endres_PublishedVersion (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2015  5:09 PM 
Fall 2014] DEMANDING SUPPLY 129 
improve the bioenergy industry, this analytical framework can 
address additional issues that may arise.  Three other ways in which 
tenant-farmers and landowners could modify the traditional lease are 
as follows.  First, landowners could require that tenant-farmers own 
or pre-negotiate access to the proper equipment for harvest,116 to 
ensure revenue streams and prompt rental payments.  Second, 
bioenergy farm leases could account for issues relating to storage and 
transport of harvested biomass to avoid post-contractual conflicts.117  
Third, the parties could stipulate how potential access to energy 
premiums and carbon credits118—which could create revenue beyond 
the sale of biomass—would be divided.119 
Bioenergy crops have important environmental benefits.  Most 
importantly, these crops provide sustainable, renewable energy.  They 
also improve soil health and reduce the risk of land erosion.  Thus, it 
is important to encourage farmers and landowners to participate in 
this burgeoning industry.  However, many of the properties that 
differentiate bioenergy crops from traditional crops make these actors 
wary of committing to grow them.  For this reason, the simplistic 
leases used for traditional crops must be adapted for the bioenergy 
crop context.  The bioenergy parties should modify their leases to 
account for: (1) the extended timeline required to effectively grow 
bioenergy crops; (2) the risk of invasiveness presented by these novel 
crops; and (3) the reclamation of rhizomes and other byproducts of 
these crops.  By doing so, the leases will protect landowners and 
farmers alike, while allowing the parties to cultivate this nascent but 
promising renewable fuel source. 
 
 
 116. Biomass harvesting equipment is similar to the equipment used for harvesting hay.  
Dolginow, supra note 40.  But see University of Illinois, Illinois Researchers Modify Equipment 
to Harvest Biomass, BIOMASS MAG. (2011), http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/5968/illinois-
researchers-modify-equipment-to-harvest-biomass (interviewing an engineer who noted that 
machines currently used for biomass harvest “are generally set up to harvest crops like hay and 
forage. There is some degree of uncertainty related to these machines working in miscanthus, 
which is a much denser, taller crop, or even switchgrass, a shorter grass.”).  
 117. The estimated yield potential for switchgrass is 4–6 tons per acre; the estimated yield 
potential for Miscanthus is 12–15 tons per acre.  Dolginow et al., supra note 40.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Credits traded on carbon markets (“carbon credits”) are tradable benefits which arise 
from the reduction or avoidance of GHG emissions.  RICARDO BAYON ET AL., VOLUNTARY 
CARBON MARKETS: AN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEY ARE AND HOW 
THEY WORK 2 (Ricardo Bayon et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).  
